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Introduction
Electoral violence is a persistent problem in many new democracies, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. An estimated sixty percent of African elections between 1990 and 2008 were marked by violence either before or after polls (Straus and Taylor 2012, 23) . In some cases, electoral violence led to temporary disruptions of the What explains the apparent effectiveness of violence as an electoral strategy?
Do voters simply discount reported violence if it implicates a politician they support?
Or do they find themselves "cross-pressured," in the sense that they wish to sanction violent politicians but pay attention to other cues as well? Much of the theoretical literature assumes that electoral violence is used by politicians to depress voting by likely opponents but does not trigger significant sanctioning or defection by those politicians' core constituents (e.g., De Figueredo and Weingast 1999; Chaturvedi 2005; Collier and Vicente 2012) . The assumption of electorally "costless" use of violence -when it comes to core supporters -is reflected in empirical work as well.
For instance, Hafner-Burton et al. (2014, (155) (156) argue that incumbents' use of preelectoral violence is effective due to its depressing effect on opposition support, but the authors do not even consider effects on incumbent support. Wilkinson and Haid (2009) suggest that violence may boost ethnic solidarity and further increase the support of core constituencies for politicians associated with violence. But the continued support of core constituencies is almost certainly contingent. Voters sometimes differentially punish right-wing and left-wing governments for violence (Arce 2003) , and individuals' own identities and attitudes toward out-groups can be shaped by factors as disparate as place of residence, election cycle timing, and past experience of violence (Eifert et al. 2010; LeBas 2010; Kasara 2013) . Personal experience of violence can also have contradictory effects on political participation, boosting it in some contexts (Blattman 2009 ) while depressing it in others (Bratton 2008) . Put simply, we know relatively little about the reactions of core supporters to information about a candidate's use of electoral violence.
Because vote-buying and other irregular election practices often occur alongside electoral violence, it is not possible to isolate the effect of violence on vote choice using election results or other observational data. To address this challenge, we employ a vignette experiment that is embedded in a nationally-representative survey in Kenya, where violence has been a consistent feature of elections since 1992.
Vignette experiments of this kind have become a common means of analyzing how voters respond to ethnic cues (Dunning and Harrison 2010; Conroy-Krutz 2013; Carlson 2015; Chauchard 2016) , corruption and criminality (Winters and WeitzShapiro 2013; Banerjee, et al. 2014) , vote-buying (Kramon 2013) , and violence (LeBas 2010; Rosenzweig 2015) .
Our vignette experiment specifically addresses two separate questions. First, is electoral violence "costless" for politicians when it comes to their own core supporters, or might rumored involvement in violence depress support or turnout even among these voters? In particular, we focus our attention on how ethnic and partisan loyalties influence the evaluation of violent politicians, as these factors have occupied a central position in analysis of both violence and voting in the developing world.
Second, how do voters' own characteristics, such as their economic conditions or past experience of violence, affect sanctioning behavior? As we detail below, the existing theoretical literature does not yield consistent predictions about which factors are likely to influence voters' sanctioning of violence, nor is there agreement about the likely direction or size of these effects.
In order to explore these questions, our survey-embedded experiment presents respondents with choices between two rival politicians, randomly varying their reported use of violence alongside other candidate attributes. This experiment then allows us to directly assess the degree to which a strong affective tie to a politician, such as coethnicity, accounts for weak or inconsistent sanctioning of violent politicians. It also allows us to probe how weaker positive cues, such as shared partisan identity and past positive performance in office, affect sanctioning behavior.
The design of the experiment allows for some presumption of secrecy of ballot, and respondents have the option of refusing to cast a ballot. As closely as possible, our design resembles the kinds of choices that ordinary voters make in real elections in many parts of the developing world. Then, we move on to discuss the country setting, vignette experiment design, and results. The last section presents conclusions.
Violence and Voting
The empirical literature on electoral violence has largely focused on identifying conditions when electoral violence is more likely to occur. In contexts of weak state institutions, electoral violence has been found to be more likely when incumbents are unpopular and face a credible threat of electoral loss (Hafner-Burton et al. 2014) , if elite patronage systems are not sufficiently inclusive (Arriola and Johnson 2013) , or in contexts of group-based exclusion and competition (Boone 2011) . Individual voter response to violence, however, has been rarely examined. Consistent with general approaches to the study of vote choice in the developing world, we focus on the effect of shared identity (e.g., coethnicity, partisan alliance) and voters' own qualities (e.g., poverty, past experience of violence) on the evaluation of candidates who are rumored to have used violence.
Individuals often rely on heuristics, easily observed candidate characteristics like ethnicity or party identity, as informational short-cuts when evaluating political candidates. Identity-based heuristics, such as ethnicity or caste, are presumed to be even more powerful in low-information contexts, as in Sub-Saharan Africa, where voters have few other sources of information about candidate quality (Posner 2005; Chandra 2007 ). Recent experimental work had provided further evidence that voters discriminate in favor of politicians with whom they share an ethnic or other affective tie (e.g., Conroy-Krutz 2013 , Adida 2015 , Carlson 2015 .
Why the preference for coethnic politicians? The literature suggests that ethnicity shapes voters' expectations of future clientelistic rewards, making them more likely to support coethnics in the absence of other information about likely candidate performance in office (Chandra 2007) . Because of these expected future benefits, voters may be more likely to forgive a coethnic or copartisan politician for criminality or corruption than would be the case for a politician with whom they do not share an affective tie. Literature in this vein often focuses on the language of "trade-offs" or strategic calculation to discuss this balancing of expected benefits alongside other negative signals (Vaishnav 2011; Winters and Weitz-Shapirro 2013) .
In a context of violent conflict between groups, individuals may not even face "tradeoffs" or cross-pressure when determining whether to support a violent politician. In these settings, violent politicians may be seen as providing protection to their coethnics, and violence may be seen a positive rather than a negative informational cue.
Alternatively, voters may prefer coethnic candidates due to emotional appeals or out of a sense of group loyalty. The idea here is that communities create order and identity through the creation of distinctions between "us" and "other." Competition between groups can sharpen these distinctions, heighten the salience of the boundary between groups, and reinforce individual attachment to group identities (Tilly 2004 ).
Episodes of violence may further harden identities or reinforce ethnic solidarity (Petersen 2002; Wilkinson and Haid 2009) , or election campaigns may boost the salience of ethnic identity (Eifert et al. 2010 ). According to this perspective, respondents are not weighing their dislike of violence versus the expected benefits of electing a coethnic or copartisan candidate; instead, they discount or disregard allegations of violence when leveled against a politician to whom they have an affective tie.
Regardless of whether we view coethnic bias as driven by strategic or emotional considerations, it can be powerful in shaping vote choice. Several experimental studies have shown that voters positively discriminate in favor of politicians with whom they share an ethnic or other affective tie (Conroy-Krutz 2013, Adida 2015 , Carlson 2015 . Voters are also more reluctant to sanction politicians for corruption or criminality when they are members of the same ethnicity or political party (Vaishnav 2011; Anduiza et al. 2013; Banerjee et al. 2014) . But the strength of these effects is affected by context and by the availability of other information cues.
Respondents' reliance on ethnicity weakens once individuals are given more information about candidates' past performance in office, popularity, or level of education (Conroy-Krutz 2013; Carlson 2015) . In some studies, improved information about past candidate performance has resulted in reduced support for low-quality and/or criminal candidates (Chang et al. 2010) , though this finding has not borne out in all contexts (Humphreys and Weinstein 2012) . The contingency of coethnic bias suggests the need for greater examination of how coethnicity interacts with other information about candidates, both positive and potentially negative.
In the analysis below, we examine whether core constituents are less likely to sanction their preferred candidates if they are poor or have experienced violence in the past. There are good reasons to believe that vulnerable populations could be more susceptible to clientelism or to emotional appeals that trigger memories of past episodes of group violence. But the existing literature does not provide consistent findings about the effects of poverty or past experience of violence on sanctioning of low-quality and criminal politicians. Wealthier and more educated voters may be more likely to sanction politicians for criminality and corruption (Anduiza et al. 2013 ), but other studies have found that the lowest-income respondents sanctioned corruption that their wealthier counterparts were willing to forgive (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013) . Other research finds no association between socioeconomic status and sanctioning criminal and violent politicians (Banerjee et al. 2014) .
With regard to voters with direct experience of violence, these individuals may also be expected to be less likely to sanction politicians who are associated with electoral violence. They may view this violence as a means of regaining their rightful property or guarding their communities against rivals (Boone 2011; Lynch 2014 Table 1 .
In our vignette experiment, we asked all survey respondents to imagine there was a vacancy for a Member of Parliament in their constituency with two candidates contesting the seat. Respondents then had the opportunity to select between these candidates in two ballots. In the first ballot we presented all respondents with the same pair of candidates only stating the candidate's name (hence implied ethnicity) and partisan information. We then randomly assigned respondents to varying information about candidate's performance records and rumored involvement in the past, after which we asked respondents to vote for one of these candidates again. The full script and ballots are included in the Appendix B.
The first of the candidates is identified as "John Onyango After the first ballot was cast, respondents were randomly assigned to one out of nine possible "treatments" which consisted of providing additional information 4 The design could have primed these identities separately, but this would have increased the number of treatments and rendered interpretation more difficult without a clear theoretical payoff.
about the two hypothetical candidates contending in the election. 6 These treatments randomly varied two conditions that are of theoretical interest: (a) information on a candidate's past record of violence (3 conditions: violent; nonviolent; no information) and (b) information about a candidate's past performance while in office (2 conditions: good performance; no information). Permutations of these different cues for each of these candidates yield nine distinct treatments, which are summarized in gives MPs discretionary funds that they can use to sponsor projects in their constituencies. It has the reputation for being subject to abuse, which has been documented by independent audits that have been made public and extensively covered in the press. 7 The respondent was either informed that an independent audit had found that the candidate had used the CDF "for its intended purpose, to tackle poverty, [and] for good quality projects" or was not given any information about the 6 We randomized these treatments by asking each respondent to select a number between one and nine, which indicated to the interviewer the script to read out load. Once respondents were randomly assigned to one of the nine potential treatments, they were asked to vote and cast another ballot in secrecy. Table A 
Results
In the analysis that follows, we analyze separately the behavior of those respondents for whom one of our hypothetical candidates was a coethnic (Kikuyus and Luos: 386 respondents) and those belonging to other ethnic groups (815 respondents). 8 For the respondents who did not have a coethnic candidate contending in our election, we grouped them as core constituents or allies of one of the candidates if they belong to an ethnic group that was in political alliance with that candidate's ethnic group in the 2013 elections, since coalitions had not shifted between the time of the election and the time of our survey. As mentioned above, these elite-level political alliances are the primary means of assembling electoral constituencies in Kenya. In order to make this assignment, we rely on voting patterns for the respondent's ethnic group in the 2013 8 We restrict our analysis to the 1201 of 1210 respondents to whom an ethnic identity could be assigned.
election. Since the official electoral results were not released by ethnicity, we determined the preferred presidential candidate of each ethnic group using the 2013 exit poll results reported in Ferree et al. (2014) . By this coding logic, we identified Embu, Kalenjin, Meru, and Pokot respondents as allies of the TNA candidate Kamau, and Kamba, Kisii, Luhya, Maasai, Mijikenda, Somali, Taita, Teso, or Turkana respondents were coded as allies of the ODM and Onyango.
Coethnic and Ethnic Ally Voting in the First Ballot
In the first ballot, which provided no information beyond candidate names and partisan affiliation, respondents cast ballots that were strongly consistent with our expectations about coethnic and ethnic ally support. Of those who cast a valid ballot and had the opportunity to vote for a coethnic candidate, 87 percent voted for their respective coethnic candidate, which is quite similar to how these individuals' selfreported vote choices in previous presidential elections as shown in Table 3 . The results of the first ballot validate our expectations regarding the strength of ethnopolitical alliances in Kenya, as well as the coding rules we follow above in placing respondents of other ethnicities into one of the two candidates' core constituencies.
Over 70 percent of the non-Kikuyu and non-Luo respondents voted for the candidate we identified as their preferred "allied" candidate.
To elucidate further the extent to which ethnicity affected vote choice, we estimate the probit regression shown in equation (1).
where the dependent variable, C, represents whether the respondents voted for the candidate for whom she would be considered a core constituent, i. respondents from other ethnic groups will vote for their presumed partisan ally. For these respondents, living in a more ethnically fragmented area -which we might see as a sign of greater "cosmopolitanism" or exposure to different viewpointsdecreases the likelihood that they vote for the candidate of the party with which their ethnic group is in alliance. Both these findings are consistent with our expectations about the ease of enforcing ethnic and partisan loyalties in more rural and more ethnically homogenous "stronghold" constituencies.
Impact of Violence and Performance Cues on Vote Choice
Prior to casting the second ballot, respondents were read one of nine scripts that provided information about the candidates' (a) rumored use of violence in a past elections and (b) CDF performance record during their past terms as Members of Parliament. Figures 1 and 2 show that the different treatments were associated with different levels of support for candidates from their core constituencies as well as different voluntary abstention rates when it came to casting ballots. As shown in Table 2 , the first treatment provides no violence or performance cue for either candidate, and it therefore serves as a reference group to which we compare other treatments' effects on vote choice. In this first treatment, 93.9 percent of Kikuyu and To ascertain whether the seeming differences across treatments are statistically significant once we control for other factors, probit regression was employed. The dependent variable in this probit regression takes the value of 1 if the respondent voted for her coethnic or ethnic ally candidate in the second ballot and 0 if she instead voted for the rival candidate. We include the same set of respondent's covariates as before (e.g., respondents' ethnicity, gender, whether poor). We add as control the set of nine different candidate combinations of violence and performance cues, such that the first treatment serves as the reference group against which other treatment effects are compared.
10 Table 4 reports the marginal effects of the violence and performance cues on violence and performance on voting by the politicians' core constituents. Columns 1-5 focus on the Luo and Kikuyu respondents only, as these respondents are able to select a coethnic candidate, whereas columns 6-10 focus on the voting behavior of respondents who have a preferred ally candidate but do not have a coethnic for whom to cast a vote. We first analyze voting patterns in Treatment 2. Coethnics and ethnic allies are faced with a choice between their preferred candidate, who is rumored to have used violence, and a non-violent rival, but these core constituents sanction their preferred candidate for his use of violence. The probability of Kikuyu and Luo respondents voting for their coethnic candidate is reduced by 36.7 percentage points, while the probability of ethnic allies voting for their allied candidate is reduced by 18 10 We include these covariates to estimate the standard errors more efficiently and alleviate for any biases introduced by chance in the randomization, a practice commonly used in the randomization literature (Duflo et al. 2007 ). Our results remain unchanged if removing these covariates. percent in comparison to Treatment 1 in which this candidate is not associated with past violence. It is worth noting that, despite the significant sanctioning, the politician who is rumored to use violence still retains more than 50 percent of the votes from his coethnic core supporters. We see a broadly similar pattern in Treatment 4, which provides the same script as Treatment 2 save for providing the violent coethnic or ethnic ally candidate with a positive CDF performance cue. Despite this positive informational cue, we again see strong sanctioning of respondents' preferred candidate for his involvement in violence when his rival is non-violent. Kikuyu and Luo respondents reduce their support for their preferred coethnic candidate by 48.5 percent, and copartisan or "ethnic allies" reduce their support by a further 21.9 percent from baseline.
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When we reverse the identity of the politician associated with violence, we do see increased solidarity within the non-violent politician's core constituencies. Put differently, the rumored use of violence by a rival shores up a non-violent candidate's support from his core constituents. This effect is especially pronounced when it comes to respondents who are copartisans or ethnic allies rather than coethnics. For instance, in Treatment 3 (column 6), these respondents increase their support for their preferred candidate by 15.5 percent when he is not associated with violence but is facing a rival 11 When assessing the impact of each treatment, we always compare its effect size with respect the reference group (Treatment 1). If we compare instead the difference in defection from violent coethnics between Treatment 2 and Treatment 4, we see no statistical difference between these two treatments for the Kikuyu and Luo respondents (chi2 test=0.33 and probability=0.5641) or for respondents from among other ethnic groups (chi2 test=0.18 and probability= 0.6685).
candidate for whom we have provided a violence cue. We do not see a similar shift for coethnic core supporters, in all likelihood because coethnic support is already quite high in the baseline treatment. Treatment 5 yields roughly similar results as Treatment 3. Once again, a non-violent coethnic or ethnic ally candidate faces a violent rival, but the violent rival is assigned a positive past CDF performance cue.
This performance cue does not diminish the swing of ethnic ally respondents in favor of their non-violent ally candidate. Thus, ethnic allies increase their support for their non-violent ally candidate a further 14.2 percentage points over their support levels in the baseline treatments when he is facing a violent but well-performing rival. These results provide consistent evidence that core constituencies sanction their own politicians for using violence against non-violent rivals but increase their support when violent rivals threaten their own preferred candidates.
There is some evidence that positive information about candidates' past performance may affect candidate evaluations when voters do not have a non-violent choice. In Treatments 7 and 8, both contending candidates are violent. In each treatment, one candidate has a positive performance cue while no information is provided about the other candidate's past performance in office. In contrast to the other scenarios discussed above, a violent candidate does not face any loss of support from his coethnic and copartisan core supporters if he also possesses a positive performance cue (Treatment 7, columns 1 and 6). When voters are faced with a violent coethnic candidate with no performance cue, they defect to the rival -a wellperforming candidate albeit also rumored to have used violence -at only marginally lower rates than in the scenarios above (Treatment 8, column 1). In this scenario, support of the violent, non-performing candidate from his coethnics is reduced by 39.5 percentage points.
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As robustness check for consistency in voting behavior in treatments 6 and 9 we provided both candidates with the same set of cues (either: both candidates are rumored to have used violence, or both are rumored to have used violence but are also reported to have good performance records). As expected, we find no change in the probability for voting for coethnic or ethnic ally candidates in these cases.
The Effect of Victimization and Poverty on Violence Sanctioning
We next assess whether there are heterogeneous effects for two types of voters that may have substantially different views about violence and about politicians: actual victims of past electoral violence and those living in poverty. In terms of the first group, about 20 percent of our respondents stated that they had been directly affected by electoral violence since 1992, suffering either personal injury, destruction of property, economic loss, or forced displacement. 13 Supporting our third hypothesis, these victims of violence are less responsive to violence cues than other respondents.
For instance, in Treatments 2 and 4, in contrast to the results presented above, victims of violence do not penalize their violent coethnic candidate (column 2 in support for a violent coethnic diminishes when he faces a violent rival who also has a good track record in delivery of constituency development projects. For victims of violence who were merely ethnic allies of the candidate rather than his coethnic, the ethnic defense mechanism seems less plausible than the habituation or reduced sensitivity mechanism. These individuals did not sanction their ethnic ally candidate for violence, but they also did not increase their support for this candidate when he faced a violent rival.
Do other vulnerable populations react similarly to victims of past violence?
We investigate differences in response among food deprived respondents, who could potentially be more sensitive to the performance cue as they have greater need for and would be more likely to be targeted by poverty alleviation programs. Roughly half of our respondents reported having gone without food at least once in the prior year.
Generally, as with victims of electoral violence, these food deprived respondents are less responsive to violence cues than the rest of population (columns 4 and 9, across all Treatments, in Table 4 ). The food deprived do not penalize their coethnic candidate for his rumored involvement in violence so long as he is also wellperforming (column 4, treatment 4). We observe a similar failure to sanction violent but well-performing ethnic ally candidates among the food deprived (column 9, Treatment 4).
The Possibility of Self-Selection Bias
So far we have focused on those respondents who cast valid ballots, as is typically in vignette experiments. One concern we might have with this approach is that results may be biased if specific types of respondents chose not to vote or "self-select" out of the experimental game. For instance, actual victims of previous electoral violence could have chosen not to play in our experiment once they heard that the involved hypothetical candidates were rumored to have used electoral violence.
The percentage of people who refused to vote in the second ballot was noticeably different across the nine treatments analyzed, thus suggesting that we face the possibility of self-selection bias (Table A. 3). To detect and correct for this possible self-selection into our respondent pool we ran a two-step Heckit regression model. In the first step, we estimate the probability of a respondent refusing to play the election game, as shown in equation (2).
Pr (R=1|Z)=Φ[Zγ]
eq. (2) where R indicates if the respondent agreed to vote for one of the two candidates in the second ballot or not. Z explanatory variables include respondent's ethnicity, gender, experience of food deprivation, direct experience of electoral violence, rural residence, the ethno-linguistic fragmentation index and provincial fixed effects.
Crucially, we also included the candidate' regarding the use of violence and performance, our nine treatments. As external instruments, we use the number of years of the person who conducted the interview, and his/her randomly assigned identification number. These instruments assess whether respondent's abstention is associated with interviewers' characteristics. Respondents might have felt more at ease with more experienced interviewers, thus increasing their willingness to participate in the voting game yet unlikely to have affected how they voted.
We then run the Heckit probit regression which estimates the probability (marginal effects) of whether respondents voted for their coethnic or partisan ally candidate, as shown in equation (3). This regression corrects for the potential bias in self-selection by adding as an additional explanatory variable a transformation of these predicted individual probabilities of response, λ, known as Inverse Mills Ratio,.
If this inverse mills ratio is found statistically significant it would suggest selfselection. That is, those who refused to vote were significantly different from those who cast valid ballots.
Pr(C=1)=Φ[β X+ρσ u λ(Zγ)]
eq. (3) where ρ is the correlation between the unobserved determinants of respondents agreeing to playing the election game, u is the unobserved determinants of voting for their coethnic candidate, and σ u is the standard deviation of u.
We find no evidence of self-selection for Kikuyu or Luo respondents in the second ballot (Table A.4) . For ethnic allies, we do find evidence of self-selection for those victims of violence and food deprived only (columns 7 and 9), but correction for this self-selection bias does not appreciably impact the results presented above. Table 5 shows the marginal effects of treatments on respondents' refusal to cast a ballot. We find that ethnic ally respondents are less likely to cast a ballot in most of the treatments in which both candidates are rumored to have used violence 14 As robustness check, we also estimated the Heckit regression model to our first ballot since 17.8 percent of our respondents refused to vote in the first ballot or left it blank, and a further 0.9 percent of respondents marked the ballot for both candidates.
As shown in Table A 
Conclusion
This article used a survey-embedded vignette experiment to better understand how electoral violence affects people's voting choice and turnout. The design counterbalanced allegations of wrong-doing -here, rumored past violence -with potential benefits that the candidate might bring, as signaled by his past good performance in delivering anti-poverty projects when in office. We find strong evidence that candidates rumored to have used electoral violence lose electoral support from voters with whom they share a partisan tie. Moreover, these candidates also face defection of some of their coethnics, especially when facing non-violent or well-performing rivals. This is a surprising result for Kenya, as electoral violence has often been characterized as a form of ethnic self-defense.
The tendency to sanction violence is, however, not consistent across all voters.
Vulnerable groups, such as respondents living in poverty or those who were previously victims of electoral violence, are less likely to sanction violent politicians, and they increase their support for violent coethnic politicians when those politicians face violent rival candidates. These findings suggest that the vote choice of vulnerable populations may be shaped to a greater extent by the promise of clientelistic rewards, or these voters may be more likely to view violent coethnic politicians as possible defenders of group interests and worthy office-holders.
An advantage of our experiment is that it allows us to assess to what extent rumors of violence affect turnout in the extreme case of voters having zero cost in casting their votes, such as going to the polls, while controlling for other confounding factors. We found rumors of candidates using violence do reduce the turnout, but only when there are no associated cues on the candidate's performance. Turnout remains unaffected once the contending violent candidates have a good performance record, perhaps as the performance cues increase the opportunity costs of not voting. Overall, our experimental findings help explaining why politicians might risk using electoral violence despite of losing some support of their electorate and why electoral violence has done little to harm to the careers of prominent politicians.
Expenditure: Riots, Competition, and Vote Swings in India." Working paper, Yale University. John Onyango has never used violence to try winning elections. We do not have any information about how Onyango used the CDF back when he was an elected MP because he, like the majority of other MPs, was not audited.
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John Onyango is rumored to have ordered one murder and hired gangs in the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested for these alleged crimes.
John Kamau has never used violence to try winning elections.
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Both John Onyango and John Kamau are rumored to have ordered one murder and hired gangs during the 2007 elections. They have not been arrested for these alleged crimes.
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John Kamau is rumored to have ordered one murder and hired gangs during the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested for these alleged crimes. Back when John Kamau was an elected MP, he was among the few MPs that were randomly and independently audited about how MPs used the CDF fund, the fund that MPs are given to reduce poverty in their constituencies. The audit found that Kamau spent the CDF fund for its intended purpose, to tackle poverty, and used it for good quality projects.
John Onyango is rumored to have ordered one murder and hired gangs in the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested for these alleged crimes. We do not have any information about how Onyango used the CDF, back when he was an elected MP because he, like the majority of other MPs, was not audited.
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John Onyango is rumored to have ordered one murder and hired gangs during the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested for these alleged crimes. Back when John Onyango was an elected MP, he was among the few MPs that were randomly and independently audited about how MPs used the CDF fund, the fund that MPs are given to reduce poverty in their constituencies. The audit found that Onyango spent the CDF fund for its intended purpose, to tackle poverty, and used it for good quality projects.
John Kamau has never used violence to try winning elections. We do not have any information about how Kamau used the CDF back when he was an elected MP because he, as the majority of other MPs, was not audited.
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John Kamau is also rumored to have ordered one murder and hired gangs in the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested either for these alleged crimes. We do not have any information about how Kamau used the CDF back when he was an elected MP because he, like the majority of other MPs, was not audited.
John Onyango and John Kamau are both rumoured to have ordered one murder and to have both hired gangs in the 2007 elections. They have not been arrested for these alleged crimes. Back when Onyango and Kamau were elected MPs, both of them were among the few MPs that got randomly and independently audited about how they managed their CDF funds, the fund that MPs are given to reduce poverty in their constituencies. The audits found they both spent the CDF fund for its intended purpose, to tackle poverty, and used it for good quality projects.
2. With this new information, I am going to ask you to secretly cast your vote in this ballot again for your preferred candidate between these two. Again, your vote will be placed in this bag and be mixed with other ballots. Your vote is private, we will respect your confidentiality and no-one will identify your name with your vote. As before you can tick in this ballot for your preferred candidate between these two. 
